ACCIDENT VP-BGI.
The January 8, 2005 the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 (VP-BGI), commanded by Capt. Leonardo Ortiz Llanos and Jorge Luis Hernandez Official first performed the flight Fajardo Cartagena - Cali got out of the landing runway at the airport in Palmira Alfonso Bonilla Aragon, serious Damage from the aircraft and minor injuries to some passengers.
According to the official report of the Secretariat SECURITY AND CONTROL UNIT SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL AVIATION concludes that:
"The accident was caused by a chain of errors and faults whose home was to accept and carry out a quick decline that led to omitting essential points in the list check as the arming of the spoilers, rats excessive descent rate and speed and faulty settings that led to placing the aircraft on the runway during abnormal and 862 meters from the normal sit-wheels.
This led to foster the conditions in the right main landing gear that led to a vibration that could not be controlled by the dimmer designed to neutralize (SHIMMY DAMPER), allowing higher loads to the strength of the scissors, which broke, giving the sequence of further damage. "
HUMAN FACTORS SUMMARY ERRORS.
The occasion rushed down the pilots made the appropriate calculations omitted so as to make a briefing to the new situation. As was the sum of the errors that led them to make an approximation not stable too high on speed, improper configuration, omitting the "CALL OUTS" set.
There is a stubbornness on the part of the commander of land, despite warnings from the copilot and most likely at its discretion and in the end is aware that they are very fast, yet persists in his goal to land as a desicion insurmountable.
It should be noted that it was the last and only landing place in that day after having delegated the other four co-pilot.
passenger's attitude was to execute a hasty lists without waiting for confirmation by the commander and most likely MISS arm the spoilers, on occasions warned of the abnormal conditions of the approach but be firm in their claims and demands .
When analyzing who did not intervene forcefully to see the impending crash, it was found that the company had flown earlier in fact one occasion intervened to take control of the commander for what he considered an extreme situation that he had been an accident.
The subsequent CONSEQUENCES were very negative to your work so you could have this event and trigger psychological predisposition to take similar decisions as presented in the accident.
It should be noted the lack of or inadequate implementation of the Resource Management CRM as when they were under pressure not properly used the coordination, leadership, teamwork, communication and decision making. Their situational awareness was poor and he lacked assertiveness copilot.
All this took place a plane on the runway in a condition abnormal which was the origin of the faults that led to the accident.
FACTOR pilot in command.
To take decisions and inadequate flight planning by not using good sense and abort the landing to make a new approach with all the security.
not followed proper procedures to bypass the arming of the spoilers, the plane set improperly and allow rats and excessive speed, and fall over. Likewise omitted checklist items evacuation.
PASSENGER.
For lack of compliance with company procedures by failing to make the "CALL OUTS" set, requiring no response in check and not have been more assertive on the suggestions to the commander .
ACCIDENT HK-4455.
The July 17, 2007 the EMB190 (HK-4455), commanded by Capt. Angel Torres and Antonio Caban First Officer Carlos Enrique Restrepo Yepes performed the flight Cali - Santa Marta got out of the landing runway at the airport Simón Bolivar ending part of the fuselage in the sea. The aircraft suffered serious structural damage ocacionados minor injuries to some passengers.
According to the report of the Secretariat SECURITY AND CONTROL UNIT SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE CIVIL AVIATION Probable Cause says
"Continuation of the approach and landing without being in a final stabilized with an excess of speed that took the aircraft to cross the runway threshold with 41 additional nodes and a low angle of approach, which made the aircraft wheels sit in a positive way when there were only 490 meters away insufficient runway available to stop the aircraft within the runway.
Lack of situational awareness in concerning the approach and landing speed after turning off the automated systems of the aircraft.
Omission CALL OUTS the part of the pilot monitoring to warn the pilot to control speeding in order to persuade him to make a missed approach.
The delay in initiating the missed approach procedure / landing interrupted in circumstances that indicated the desirability of such a measure as the approximation destabilized.
misperception to believe to stop the aircraft within the limited remaining available runway without analyzing the status of this and distance without having positive contact motivated by excessive speed. "
HUMAN FACTORS.
According to hours flown in the past 90.30 and 3 days, rest periods, holidays and service times is not apparent fatigue in the crew for the flight safely.
According to the recommendations of the company is recommended to use the autopilot for non-precision approaches, where the non-use should be discussed at length the procedure between the two pilots. The pilot in command decided to fly the plane manually, without complying with the recommendations of the company in this case aggravated by the condition of the track in terms of length and wet state where braking conditions are lower with respect to dry track. This attitude differs in the use of FLAPS and selection of AUTO BRAKE.
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